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Michael Tonry

Punishment and Human
Dignity: Sentencing
Principles for Twenty-FirstCentury America

ABSTRACT

A new conception of justice in punishment is needed that is premised on respect for offenders’ human dignity. It needs to acknowledge retributive and
utilitarian values and incorporate independently important values of fairness
and equal treatment. Punishment principles, policies, and practices lined up
nicely in mid-twentieth-century America. Utilitarian principles implied a
primary goal of crime prevention through rehabilitation and avoidance of
unnecessary suffering by offenders. Judges and parole boards were empowered
to tailor decisions to ﬁt offenders’ circumstances and interests. Corrections
ofﬁcials sought to address rehabilitative needs and facilitate achievement of
successful, law-abiding lives. The system often did not work as it should, but its
ideals, aspirations, and aims were clear. In our time, there are no commonly
shared principles; sentencing laws and practices are unprecedentedly rigid and
severe; judges and parole boards often lack authority to make sensible or just
decisions; corrections ofﬁcials are expected simultaneously to act as police
ofﬁcers, actuaries, and social workers; and injustice is ubiquitous.

There is no commonly accepted normative framework in the United States
for thinking or talking about punishment. This is unique among western
European and English-speaking countries. In Scandinavian countries, al-
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most all philosophers, lawyers, and judges, and most policy makers, agree
that the severity of punishments should be proportioned to the seriousness
of crimes, that comparable offenders should be treated as equally as is humanly possible, and that offenders should not be avoidably damaged by
what happens to them. In German-speaking, Benelux, and southern European countries, proportionality is widely agreed to be the primary consideration but counterbalanced by reluctance to harm people by imprisoning
them and by aspirations to facilitate offenders’ achievement of satisfying,
law-abiding lives. In other English-speaking countries, proportionality and
equality receive relatively less emphasis than in western Europe but considerably more than in the United States. Utilitarian considerations of deterrence, incapacitation, and moral education loom comparatively large,
but constrained by widely shared concerns that offenders be treated fairly
and not be punished unduly severely.1
Please don’t misunderstand. The preceding paragraph is not meant to
suggest that other Western countries’ systems deliver perfect justice or
achieve the fairness, consistency, and equal treatment to which they aspire. Human institutions never work like that no matter how hard people
try. The descriptions nonetheless accurately depict common aspirations
to treat offenders justly and empathetically, to honor the biblical injunction to do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
In all of those other countries, legal institutions, processes, and rules
aim to assure that offenders are treated justly, consistently, and humanely
or, as the late American philosopher Ronald Dworkin (1977) put it, as
equals and with concern and respect for their interests. As protection
against foreseeable pressures toward injustice, decisions affecting individuals are insulated from inﬂuence by politicians or public opinion:
judges and prosecutors are career civil servants. There are tight limits
on maximum sentences. When, rarely, laws prescribe particular or minimum sentences for speciﬁc crimes, judges have discretion to impose lesser
ones.
The United States is an outlier in all these matters. Only in America
are judges and prosecutors elected2 and are public opinion, media attention, or political considerations widely believed to be germane to their

1
Sources for assertions about other countries’ legal systems in this paragraph and in the
next few can be found in Tonry (2012, 2016b).
2

Except in nonpartisan elections in a handful of Swiss cantons.
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work. Only here has the sentencing authority of judges, who are ethically
obligated to do justice in individual cases, been subordinated to powers
of prosecutors and legislators who have political, career advancement,
and other self-interested objectives in mind. To them, concern and respect for offenders’ interests are seldom centrally important. Often—as
when mandatory minimum sentence, truth-in-sentencing, three-strikes,
and life without parole laws apply—they are entirely absent. Only in the
United States are prison sentences often measured in decades and lifetimes. Only in the United States is meaningful review of sentences in individual cases largely unavailable.3
Those stark contrasts are recent. They date from the 1970s and 1980s.
Before that, the American approach was different from those of other
countries but principled and coherent. Every jurisdiction had an indeterminate sentencing system in which treatment of offenders was to be individualized in every case and at every stage. There was wide support for
rehabilitation as the primary goal; for judges, parole boards, and prison
ofﬁcials to take account of individuals’ circumstances and interests in
making decisions about them; and for imposition of the least restrictive
appropriate sentence. Retribution per se was not a goal. Retribution is
“the unstudied belief of most men,” observed Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler (1940, pp. 7, 11), two of the twentieth century’s most inﬂuential criminal lawyers, but that, like any other ignoble intuition, should
be ignored. “No legal provision can be justiﬁed merely because it calls for
the punishment of the morally guilty by penalties proportioned to their
guilt,” they continued, “or criticized merely because it fails to do so.”
“Rehabilitation,” observed Wechsler, later the primary draftsman of
the Model Penal Code (American Law Institute 1962), “is in itself a social
value of importance, a value, it is well to note, that is and ought to be the
prime goal” (1961, p. 468). Under the code, judges in every case could

3
This is mostly because the US Supreme Court since the 1970s has emasculated constitutional standards for review of disproportionately severe punishments under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1001 (1991), in which the defendant, a ﬁrst offender convicted of cocaine possession, was sentenced to life without parole, Justice Kennedy observed, “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids
only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” The Court laid
foundations earlier. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980), upholding a sentence
of life without parole for theft of $120.75, the Court observed that the proportionality principle “would . . . come into play in the extreme example . . . if a legislature made overtime
parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”
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impose any lawful sentence from unsupervised probation to the maximum authorized by law. There were no mandatory minimum sentences
and no probation ineligibility laws. Parole boards could release prisoners
any time after they became eligible. The code created presumptions
against the use of imprisonment in every case, including homicides, and
in favor of parole release. Prison ofﬁcials could grant time off for good
behavior.
The Model Penal Code was not merely an academic exercise. It was
commissioned and approved by the American Law Institute, a law reform
organization composed mostly of lawyers in large law ﬁrms and state and
federal judges (Tonry 2004, chap. 7). The drafting committee contained
many more judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and corrections ofﬁcials
than professors. Nearly half of the code was drafted under the direction of
Paul C. Tappan, a career parole ofﬁcial.
Politicians and public ofﬁcials were on board. This can be seen in a series of contemporaneous initiatives. In 1963, the Advisory Committee of
Judges proposed the Model Sentencing Act. In 1967, the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice led by
US Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach issued its report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. In 1971, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws chaired by California Governor Edmund
Brown released a Proposed Federal Criminal Code. In 1973, the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, appointed by President Richard M. Nixon and chaired by Republican Delaware Governor Russell Peterson, issued its report. All four documents,
like the Model Penal Code, supported indeterminate sentencing and sought
to improve it.
That consensus soon collapsed. In the cultural climate of the 1970s,
when the prisoners’ rights, civil rights, and due process movements were
strongest, individualized decision making was widely believed to be unfair, to result in unjust disparities, and to produce arbitrary, capricious,
and racially biased results (Blumstein et al. 1983). Emphases on individual rights, exempliﬁed by the writings of John Rawls (1971), Robert Nozick (1974), and Ronald Dworkin (1977), helped shape an intellectual climate that emphasized fairness, consistency, and equal treatment.
All of those developments ﬁt more comfortably with retributive than
with utilitarian values. Marvin Frankel (1973), a prominent federal judge,
described American sentencing as “lawless” and offered then-radical
proposals to improve it. Inﬂuential books by Norval Morris (1974) and
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Andreas von Hirsch (1976) promoted “limiting retributive” and “just
deserts” theories calling for the fairness, evenhandedness, and consistency that indeterminate sentencing was said to lack.4
A large and sophisticated theoretical literature on retribution emerged
but quickly became entirely disconnected from punishment policies and
practices. It appeared in the 1970s as if fairer, more just sentencing systems would be widely adopted to replace indeterminate sentencing, but
that happened only in a few places, and only for a few years. Criminal justice policy instead became highly politicized, legislatures enacted laws of
historically unprecedented severity and rigidity, few people seemed to
care much about the new laws’ effects on individual offenders, and imprisonment rates began a three-decade increase (Tonry 2016a, chap. 2).
It is impossible to develop principled retributive justiﬁcations for lengthy
prison terms for sellers of a few grams of drugs, minimum 25-year or life
sentences for routine property crimes, or life without parole for almost
anything or anyone. Proportionality between offense seriousness and punishment severity is an element of all retributive conceptions of punitive
justice. Minor drug sales, thefts, and assaults are in everyone’s minds less
serious than rapes and serious violence but often are punished more severely.
As things now stand, there is no generally accepted American jurisprudence of punishment. Mandatory minimum sentence, three-strikes, and
life without parole laws, indefensible by any normative theory, coexist
with a few state sentencing guidelines systems loosely based on retributive premises and a majority of state systems with hodge-podges of features of determinate and indeterminate sentencing. A plethora of drug
and other problem-solving courts, restorative justice initiatives, prisoner
reentry programs, and reinvigorated treatment programs ﬁt comfortably
within the utilitarian values of indeterminate sentencing.
The lack of a widely agreed jurisprudence is not merely untidy, a matter that should be of concern only to ivory tower intellectuals. It has huge
and morally troubling consequences. Individuals charged with drug or
violent offenses subject to lengthy mandatory minimum prison sentences,
for example, almost always serve those sentences if they are prosecuted and

4
Von Hirsch, named Andreas when he was born in Germany, used the anglicized
Andrew when he lived in the United States and England. Since returning to Germany,
he has resumed use of Andreas, including in scholarly writing. Sources are listed under
the name in which they were originally published.
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convicted. However, if prosecutors or judges divert them to drug courts,
mental health programs, or elsewhere, they may avoid conviction, imprisonment, or both. For cases not subject to mandatories, prosecutors and
judges possess unfettered discretion.5 The luck of the draw, not normative
ideas about justice, determines whether people wind up in prison for years,
in community treatment programs, or diverted from the criminal justice
system.
Retributive theories remain in vogue in law schools and philosophy
departments but do not provide adequate guidance for thinking about
justice in the real world. Theorists focus mostly on blameworthiness and
moral communication, and incidentally on crime prevention, even though
punishment implicates a wider range of important values and interests including fairness and equal treatment. Difﬁcult problems, the English political theorist Isaiah Berlin observed, almost always encompass competing
normative principles: “The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must
inevitably involve the sacriﬁce of others” (2002, pp. 213–14).
Abortion is one example. Some people believe fetuses are human beings,
human life is sacred, and abortion is morally wrong and should be prohibited. Others believe women are entitled to control their bodies, pregnancy is quintessentially a private matter, and state interference is morally
wrong and should be eschewed. Public policy must favor one set of beliefs
over the other or compromise both.
Child protection offers a less polarized example. Most people believe
in a principle of family autonomy: parents should be allowed to decide
what kinds of lives they and their children live; this implies a strong presumption against state interference. Minimization of harm to children
implies a presumption in favor of state action whenever risks exist. Probably everyone believes that family autonomy should be respected and that
children should be protected. Both goals cannot be simultaneously maximized. Any imaginable policy choice involves trade-offs: greater autonomy means heightened risks; reduced risks mean less autonomy.

5
Meaningful appellate sentence review is unavailable in most states. The US Supreme
Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), held that discretionary charging
decisions by prosecutors are seldom reviewable by courts, and many of the 90–95 percent
of defendants who plead guilty are required as a condition to waive their rights to appeal
(King and O’Neill 2005).
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The way forward concerning punishment becomes clearer when we
recognize that it implicates multiple, competing values, including not
only deserved punishment and crime prevention but also fairness and
equal treatment. A comprehensive jurisprudence of just punishment for
twenty-ﬁrst-century America would thus incorporate four propositions:
•

•

•

•

Justice as Fairness: Processes for responding to crimes should be
publicly known, implemented in good faith, and applied evenhandedly (Rawls 1958).
Justice as Equal Treatment: Defendants and offenders should be
treated as equals; their interests should be accorded concern and
respect when decisions affecting them are made (Dworkin 1977).
Justice as Proportionality: Offenders should never be punished more
severely than can be justiﬁed by their blameworthiness in relation
to the severity of punishments justly imposed on others for the same
and different offenses (Morris 1974).
Justice as Parsimony: Offenders should never be punished more severely than can be justiﬁed by appropriate, valid, normative purposes (Tonry 1994).

Those four propositions describe what people accused or convicted of
crimes would want for themselves or their loved ones. They describe
minimum, interacting requirements of a just system of punishment. Together they provide answers to problems that traditional punishment
theories by themselves cannot resolve. Respect for human dignity does
not appear as a separate proposition. It encompasses all four propositions.
Human dignity is often dismissed as a nebulous, primarily rhetorical
concept (Macklin 2003; cf. Waldron 2014). The reason is partly that neither the term nor the concept plays an independent, substantive role in
American law (Steiker 2014) and partly that the term appears prominently in the preambles to international human rights documents such
as the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights but in their texts
is given no concrete work to do (Waldron 2012).
These critiques have merit when human dignity is used rhetorically,
but not when it is used concretely, as I show in Section II, in relation
to sentencing and other individualized decisions affecting individuals.
Torture denies human dignity to its victims. So does solitary conﬁnement in a supermax prison. So does requiring people to live in squalid,
inhuman conditions. So does denial to individuals of the possibility ever

126

Michael Tonry

to live a satisfying life. So does making decisions about individuals’ lives
and futures without taking account of their circumstances and interests.
None of those practices is practically necessary or morally justiﬁable.
Conceptual and procedural tools exist to acknowledge human dignity
in relation to punishment and sentencing. The preceding four propositions about justice in punishment encapsulate them.
The idea that punishment implicates values and interests other than
moral blameworthiness, crime prevention, and moral education is not
new. Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, the pioneers of retributive
and utilitarian punishment theories, recognized two centuries ago that extrinsic considerations sometimes limit or forbid punishments that could
otherwise be justiﬁed.6 I don’t endorse the propositions they offer but
quote them to illustrate that even single-minded theorists recognize that
punishment implicates values other than retribution and crime prevention.
In this essay, I explain why retributive theories that dominate contemporary scholarly writing cannot adequately elucidate what a just punishment system should look like. I discuss utilitarian and other nonretributive
theories only brieﬂy and incidentally. They attract little contemporary
support; most people who think or write about these subjects are retributivists of one sort or another. I begin in the ﬁrst section with a brief primer
on punishment philosophy for readers who may not be familiar with retributive punishment theories, ideas, and concepts.7 I then canvass a series
of fundamental dilemmas courts face on which retributive theories cast little light. These include how to assess blameworthiness, practical problems
in administration of the criminal law, and the multiple offense paradox that
punishments per offense usually decrease when offenses are sentenced simultaneously but increase when they are sentenced successively (Tonry
2017).

6
Kant ([1797] 2011, p. 34) observed that sometimes the sovereign “will want to avoid
adversely affecting the feelings of the people” and some penalty other than the uniquely
deserved one may be imposed. Bentham ([1789] 1970, p. 164) wrote that otherwise appropriate punishments should not be imposed when too many people would have to be
punished, making the aggregate punishment too great; when punishment would cause
the loss of the offender’s “extraordinary value” to the community; when community opinion
is strongly that the offense or offender should not be punished, or punished so much; and
when relations with foreign powers would be undermined.
7
The primer focuses on basic concepts and uncontroversial distinctions. Readers familiar with punishment philosophy may want to skim or skip subsection I.A.
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In the second section, I elaborate on the normative framework set out
above. Proportionality, a retributive touchstone, is a core component. It
provides tools for comparing punishments for different offenses and different offenders. It and Benthamite parsimony set intelligible limits on
punishments that may justly be imposed. So, however, independently,
do fairness and equality.

I. The Limited Reach of Retributivism
Few would disagree that authoritative, normative expression of censure
for wrongdoing is the, or a, core function of criminal convictions and
punishments imposed by judges. Big disagreements emerge, however,
when the focus shifts from judges to offenders. To decide how much censure one offender deserves relative to deserved censures of others, convincing ways to assess blameworthiness and to determine just punishments
are needed. Large conceptual disagreements and practical impediments
stand in the way. Before I discuss them, I ﬁrst provide a brief introduction
to punishment theory.
A. A Punishment Primer
Three main strands of punishment theory—retributivism, utilitarianism, and positivism—emerged over the last two centuries. Retributive
theories, ﬁrst developed in some detail in Germany by Kant ([1797]
1965) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ([1821] 1991), called for imposition of punishments apportioned to the seriousness of crimes. Kant
famously observed: “What kind and what degree of punishment does
public legal justice adopt as its principle and standard? None other than
the principle of equality. . . . Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you
afﬂict on someone else among the people is one that you [deserve]. . . .
Only the law of retribution ( jus talionis) can determine exactly the kind
and degree of punishment” ([1797] 2011, p. 32).8 Retributive ideas, usually less dogmatic than Kant’s, have been continuously inﬂuential in continental Europe though not in the United States (Pifferi 2012, 2016). In
the United States they gained support in the 1960s and 1970s and remain

8
Hegel expressed the same view: “The universal feeling of peoples and individuals towards crime is, and always has been, that it deserves to be punished, and that what the criminal has done should be done to him” (Hegel [1821] 2011, p. 46; my emphasis)
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inﬂuential today. There are many different kinds of retributive theory,
but they share the view that moral blameworthiness is an important consideration in determining just punishments.
Utilitarian theory is usually dated from the publication in 1764 of
Cesare Beccaria’s Dei delitti e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments; 2007).
He urged that punishments be scaled to the seriousness of crimes and used
to deter offenders and others from wrongdoing. Bentham ([1789] 1970,
[1830] 2008), the archetypal utilitarian theorist, developed deterrent ideas
in far greater detail. Bentham’s proposals were based on ideas he shared
with Beccaria, combined with a model of rational human beings who engage in calculation of pains and pleasures. The pains of punishment should
always exceed the envisioned pleasures to be gained from crime.
The object of the criminal law for Bentham was to “augment the total
happiness of the community” and “to exclude, as far as may be, every thing
that tends to subtract from that happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief ” (1970, p. 158). Crime is a form of mischief. To prevent crime
through deterrence, Bentham offered detailed prescriptions. Punishments
should be severer for more serious crimes to encourage offenders to commit lesser ones, should be increased if the probability of apprehension is
low so the deterrent message will not be diluted, should be incrementally
scaled to each detail of a contemplated offense so offenders have incentives
to stop partway, and should be lower for attempted than for completed
offenses to provide incentive to desist. Critically, however, despite his view
that the idea of abstract human rights is “nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham
2002, pp. 317–401; Schoﬁeld 2003), everyone’s happiness—including that
of offenders—counts: “But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in
itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted,
it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil” (Bentham 1970, p. 158). Bentham’s ideas shaped prevailing ways of
thinking in English-speaking countries and provided the impetus to indeterminate sentencing as it emerged and endured in the United States.
They remain central in other English-speaking countries.
In our time, the word “consequentialism” is often substituted for utilitarianism.9 This, however, is based on a misconception that utilitarians

9
In our time, the only well-developed nonutilitarian punishment theory that might also
fall under the consequentialist heading is John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit’s “republican
theory” (1990, 2001). It differs from classic utilitarianism in that it seeks to maximize not
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are interested only in deterrence. Bentham did, it is true, emphasize deterrent considerations. However, he also wrote about rehabilitation, incapacitation, and moral education, as did others who preceded him.10 His
overriding aim was to minimize the harms that result from crime, both to
victims and to offenders.
In earlier times, including in the United States, many American
intellectuals could be described as “positivists” (e.g., Glueck 1928; Pifferi
2016). Positivism is most famously associated with the Italian criminal
lawyer Enrico Ferri (1906, 1921). Ferri, like many others of his time,
was a determinist and believed that crime resulted primarily from social,
economic, and psychological forces affecting offenders. The only valid
purpose of the criminal law, he wrote, is the prevention of crime. Accordingly, the likelihood of reoffending should be the primary consideration.
All prison sentences should be indeterminate, potentially for life, including for people convicted of minor offenses. Prisoners should be imprisoned only if they are dangerous. They should be released when they
cease to be dangerous but held indeﬁnitely if their dangerousness does
not abate. Reverberations of positivism echoed through the mid-twentieth
century (e.g., Wootton 1959, 1963; Ancel 1965; Menninger 1966), but it
has largely disappeared in theoretical writing. Similar views are inarticulately present in the implicit logic behind contemporary prison sentences
measured in decades and lifetimes and enactment of three-strikes, career
criminal, sexual predator, and life without parole laws.
Only retributivist theories are much discussed in our time or, for that
reason, in the rest of this essay. Their details vary; the implications vary

happiness or, synonymously, utility, but “dominion.” Dominion is the human capacity to
live an unconstrained life of one’s choosing, limited by the obligation to respect others’
rights to dominion over their own lives. Crimes violate victims’ dominion. The theory
has been discussed mostly in relation to restorative justice concerning which it calls for a
decrementalist strategy of reduction in the use of punishment. Braithwaite (2018, p. 110),
however, plaintively noted, “Braithwaite and Pettit’s (1990) decrementalist research agenda
went nowhere in the 28 years since it was proposed.” Republican theory in relation to punishment has not provoked much writing by others, so I do not pursue it further here.
10
William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, e.g., earlier wrote that
the end of punishment is not “atonement or expiation,” but “a precaution against future
offenses of the same kind. This is effected three ways: either by the amendment of the offender himself; . . . or by deterring others . . .; or, lastly, by depriving the party injuring of
the power to do future mischief [ by execution, permanent conﬁnement, slavery, or exile]”
([1769] 1979, p. 13). Bentham (1970, p. 158, n. a) offers a similar list of crime prevention
mechanisms.

130

Michael Tonry

less.11 Retributivist ideas began to revive in the 1950s in writings by
Norval Morris (1953), John Rawls (1955), and H. L. A. Hart (1959), who
argued in different ways that preventive goals should be combined with
retributive limits.
Many kinds of primarily retributive theories emerged. In the ﬁrst generation, Herbert Morris (1966), Jeffrie Murphy (1973), and Andreas von
Hirsch (1976) argued that people in a democratic society beneﬁt from
public order and security, including others’ law-abidingness, are reciprocally obligated in return to accept the burdens and responsibilities of citizenship, and should be punished if they do not. The next generation, exempliﬁed by Joel Feinberg (1970), Herbert Morris (1981), Jean Hampton
(1984), and Antony Duff (2001), in different ways emphasized moral communication with offenders, victims, and the larger community about the
wrongfulness of crime. Related censure theories offered by Duff (1986)
and von Hirsch (1994) focused more narrowly on authoritative denunciation of wrongdoing. A third generation, harking back to Kant and Hegel,
portrayed punishment as a morally necessary consequence of culpable
wrongdoing (Robinson 1987; Moore 1993).
The lines that separate different kinds of retributive theory blur. Some,
especially communicative theories, are difﬁcult to distinguish from utilitarian ones. Most deal only with justiﬁcation of punishment as an institution and do not explicitly address questions pertinent to individual
offenders, particularly how much they should be punished.12 Discussions
of whether the state may justly punish offenders, and why, are intellectually interesting but not especially helpful to policy makers, prosecutors,
and judges.
Retributivists of every stripe believe that offenders’ blameworthiness is
fundamental in some way to justifying punishment. They differ on what

11
Many efforts have been made to describe and taxonomize varieties of retributivism.
Classic ones include Hart (1968, postscript), Cottingham (1979), Mackie (1982), and
Walker (1991). I provide a recent accounting (Tonry 2011).
12
For example: “One question is: What might justify the state’s creation of legal institutions of punishment? This is what we call the ‘justiﬁcation’ question. The second question is: Once the state has determined someone’s liability for a crime, how much and what
kind of punishment should the state mete out in response? This is the ‘sentencing’ question. That a retributivist theorist gives a retributive (or, speciﬁcally, communicative) answer to the
justiﬁcation question does not require her to offer a precise answer for each sentencing question. . . .
A retributive conception of proportionality need not have much in the way of precision to say about
the particular details of punishment’s implementation” (Markel 2010, pp. 950–51; emphasis
added).
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way. Because some basic retributivist concepts and distinctions arise in
subsequent parts of this essay, I highlight several.
1. Positive and Negative Retributivism. Positive retributivism is a sword
that cuts deservedly deeply and precisely. Negative retributivism is a
shield that protects against undeservedly severe punishments.
Positive retributivists believe that deserved punishments must be imposed. Kant and Hegel are often portrayed as positive retributivists. Remember Kant’s “principle of equality” and jus talionis? Paul Robinson
(1987, 2008) and von Hirsch (1994, 2017) offer similar arguments.
Negative retributivists, to the contrary, believe that offenders’ blameworthiness in relation to particular crimes sets upper limits on deserved
punishments that may but need not be imposed. If good reasons exist for
a lesser punishment, or no punishment at all, that is what should be done.
“Limiting retributivism,” a form of negative retributivism associated
with Norval Morris (1974), warrants separate mention primarily because
it has been particularly inﬂuential (Frase 2013). The Model Penal Code:
Sentencing, for example, explicitly adopts it as a normative premise (American Law Institute 2017, sec. 3.102[2]).
2. Mixed Theories. “Mixed theories” encompass combinations of retributive ideas with instrumental ideas about preventive effects of sanctions, the signiﬁcance of contextual considerations, or special circumstances of individual cases. All negative retributivist theories, including
limiting retributivism, are mixed theories.13
Use of the term mixed theory dates from Hart’s Punishment and Responsibility (1968), a seminal work, in which he summarized his primarily utilitarian personal beliefs but noted that widely held views about deserved
punishment need also to be taken into account. Hart and Norval Morris
(1974), essentially utilitarians, believed widely shared intuitions about
equality and proportionality in punishment to be important. They feared
that the criminal law would lose legitimacy in citizens’ eyes, and thus effectiveness, if it departed too much from prevailing community sentiments. Few people today espouse unqualiﬁed retributive views (e.g., Moore
1993). Nearly all modern writers offer mixed theories.
3. Censure and Hard Treatment. Many contemporary retributivists
regard punishment as a form of moral communication (e.g., von Hirsch
13
Braithwaite and Pettit’s republican theory (1990, 2001) is better thought of as a form
of negative retributivism than as a utilitarian or consequentialist theory. They are adamant
that the offender’s moral culpability sets an absolute, proportionate upper limit on punishment severity and equally adamant that retributive considerations are otherwise irrelevant.
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2017). They generally feel obliged, however, to explain why communication of censure for wrongdoing is not the end of the matter: “You have
sinned; go forth and sin no more.” Most punishments for crime, however, involve intrusive, burdensome, or otherwise unpleasant elements.
Many writers as a result partition punishment into censure and “hard
treatment” and try separately to justify hard treatment. Most efforts are
nonretributive (von Hirsch 2017: “prudential reasons to obey the law”)
or unconvincing (H. Morris 1981; Duff 2001: offenders themselves would
wish it so).
4. Ordinal and Cardinal Desert. This distinction, ﬁrst proposed by
von Hirsch (1992), addresses the problem of knowing what speciﬁc punishment a particular offender deserves. God may know, but human beings have widely different intuitions. The solution, von Hirsch proposed,
is to distinguish between punishment that is in some sense absolutely deserved, which he called cardinal desert, and punishment that is deserved
for particular crimes relative to those deserved for other crimes. This he
called ordinal desert. Ordinal desert can be coherently calculated by creating scales of offense seriousness and specifying appropriate punishments for the most and least serious offenses. Once that’s done, a punishment scale can be created that parallels the offense seriousness scale.14
The absolutely deserved punishment for robbery may be unknowable,
but everyone would agree that the relatively deserved punishment for
simple robbery, all else being equal, should normally be less than for aggravated robbery and more than for theft.
These concepts and terms recur throughout the rest of this essay. I use
and refer to them because they are in common usage. As a practical matter, however, the problems and solutions I discuss are common to all retributive theories, whether positive or negative, and all mixed theories.
B. Conceptual Impediments
Retributive and mixed theories that link deserved punishments to the
seriousness of the crimes of which people are convicted cannot by them-

14
Hegel recognized that prevailing ideas about severity of deserved punishment change
over time: “With the progress of education, however, attitudes toward crime become more
lenient, and punishments today are not nearly so harsh as they were a hundred years ago. It
is not the crimes or punishments themselves which change, but the relation between the
two” (2011, p. 42).
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selves resolve two inescapable problems: the multiple offense paradox
and assessment of blameworthiness.
1. The Multiple Offense Paradox. The emerging if exiguous literature
on punishment for multiple crimes exposes a paradox that retributive
theories, whether positive ones that specify punishments that must be
imposed or negative ones that set upper limits, cannot adequately address
or explain. Punishments of people convicted of multiple crimes are often
discounted if sentences are imposed at one time (a “bulk discount”) but
enhanced if imposed at different times (a “recidivist premium”; Reitz
2010). This is perverse. Exactly the same sets of crimes can be handled
either way—in one omnibus prosecution or in a series—depending on
how prosecutors choose to proceed or on the happenstance of when
offenses come to light. This is a serious problem because it arises in a majority of cases. Most convicted offenders are concurrently convicted of
multiple offenses, have been previously convicted, or both.
a. The Recidivist Premium. Some writers, including George Fletcher
(1978), Richard Singer (1979), and Mirko Bagaric (2010), reject the recidivist premium in principle. Their logic is that punishing repeat offenders more severely because of their prior convictions is double counting.
The increment of additional punishment for the new crime is in effect
additional punishment for earlier ones. The constitutional doctrine of
double jeopardy forbids the state to try someone twice for the same crime.
By extension, the state should not punish someone twice for the same
crime.
The few efforts that have been made by retributivists to justify the recidivist premium are unpersuasive. I am not alone in my skepticism.
Richard Lippke (2016, p. 17) surveyed the arguments and similarly concluded, “Like others, I ﬁnd the arguments given on behalf of recidivist
premiums unconvincing.”
One unconvincing argument is that repeat offenders who commit new
offenses are more blameworthy than ﬁrst offenders because previous
convictions impose special obligations not to offend again (Lee 2010).
Everyone, however, has a civic responsibility not to commit crimes. It
is hard to explain why the responsibility to obey the law is greater for
the previously convicted. It cannot be because greater knowledge or selfcontrol can reasonably be imputed to them. Most repeat offenders no
doubt know that behavior they contemplate is unlawful, but so do most
ﬁrst offenders. Members of both groups sometimes commit offenses under extreme social, economic, or circumstantial pressures, or inﬂuenced
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by deviant subcultural norms, that make law-abidingness especially difﬁcult. This might or might not make individuals less blameworthy, but it
offers no basis for differentiating between ﬁrst-time and repeat offenders.
Other unconvincing arguments supporting the recidivist premium assert that repeat offending is evidence of bad character or constitutes disrespect or deﬁance of the court, the criminal law, or the state (Bennett
2010; Lee 2017). If any of these considerations were taken seriously, it
would require that speciﬁc increments of punishment be attributed to
character ﬂaws or traits. Punishments for a subsequent crime could be
deconstructed into the conventional X months that would be imposed
for a ﬁrst robbery and an increment of Y months, for example, for bad
character. Deﬁance, disrespectfulness, and bad character, however, are
not criminal offenses. They might be punishable in China, but not in a
liberal democratic state.
Von Hirsch (1986, 2017) has argued that punishments should be
discounted for ﬁrst offenses, and possibly one or a few more. This is a different kind of argument than those justifying the recidivist premium even
though the result, punishing repeat offenders more severely than ﬁrst
offenders, is the same. It is based on the premise that ﬁrst and early
offenses may have resulted from extraordinary circumstances or otherwise have been “out of character” and thus warrant less-than-deserved
punishment. This is a contingent characterological claim about ﬁrst offenders: they may, on average, be more responsible people than recidivists are and should be given the beneﬁt of the doubt. There may be
good policy reasons to give ﬁrst offenders beneﬁts of doubts, and this often happens (Braithwaite 2018), but justifying them as reﬂections of hypothesized good or bad character is as troubling here as elsewhere. Von
Hirsch in any case, once the ﬁrst or early offender discount is exhausted,
would not allow increased punishments on account of former offenses.
Contrary to any argument that can be made for the recidivist premium, an empirically grounded argument can be made that prior convictions should mitigate rather than aggravate punishments for subsequent
crimes. Collateral social and legal effects of convictions make it foreseeably more difﬁcult for former offenders than for nonoffenders to live lawabiding lives (Ashworth and Wasik 2017). Research showing that imprisonment makes people more, not less, likely to commit subsequent offenses
conﬁrms this (e.g., Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson 2009).
b. The Bulk Discount. No one rejects the bulk discount in principle,
with the tentative exception of Jesper Ryberg (2017), who canvasses pos-
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sible arguments for it and ﬁnds none he judges to be persuasive.15 Lippke
(2011) offers the most extensive analysis to date of what a jurisprudence
of bulk discounts, taken seriously, might look like and shows that it would
be immensely complex and not generally justiﬁable.
Policy justiﬁcations have been offered. One is that no punishment
should be so “crushing” that it deprives a person of a large fraction of
his or her remaining life ( Jareborg 1998; Ashworth and Wasik 2017)
or a high proportion of the prime years of life (Bottoms 1998). A second
is that bulk discounts can be justiﬁed as extensions of mercy based on
judges’ holistic assessments of offenders’ lives and blameworthiness (Bottoms 2017). These propositions, however, are ad hoc, unimbedded in
broader general theories, and ungeneralizable. The policy they try to
justify is no doubt desirable, lest individuals suffer extreme punishments
based on the fortuity that they have been charged with more rather than
fewer offenses, but it cannot be justiﬁed in terms of retributive theories.
There is convincing empirical evidence that majorities of the public,
judges, and offenders approve of both the bulk discount and the recidivist premium (Roberts 2008; Roberts and De Keijser 2017). Some argue
that those broadly shared intuitions justify the paradox either because
democratic values require acknowledgment of and deference to widely
shared beliefs or because failure to do so will undermine the legitimacy
of law and the legal process in citizens’ minds (Roberts 2011; Ryberg and
Roberts 2014). Common intuitions, however, by themselves cannot offer a principled justiﬁcation for anything. Widely shared intuitions, for
example, about racial, gender, ethnic, and sexual preference differences,
or in our time about the moral worthiness of immigrants, are often empirically indefensible and normatively repellent.
c. Empirical Reality. No one has satisfactorily offered principled justiﬁcation for why punitive punches should be pulled when people are
sentenced for multiple offenses but swung harder when they have previously been convicted. This is not a small failure. These issues arise in a
large majority of criminal cases. The typical defendant is not a ﬁrst-timer
charged with a single offense but a recidivist offender charged with multiple offenses.
Table 1 presents 2009 American data, the most recent available when
this was written, on multiple current charges of felony defendants in the
15
Ryberg (2001) was a decade ahead of the game, canvassing multiple offense issues in
detail long before others began writing about them.
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TABLE 1
Multiple Charges, by Most Serious Felony,
75 Largest US Counties, 2009
Most Serious Charge
All felonies
Violence
Murder
Rape
Robbery
Property
Motor vehicle theft
Burglary
Drugs

No Other Charge (%)

Other Charges (%)

45
37
39
32
39
47
48
33
46

55
63
61
68
61
53
52
67
54

SOURCE.—Reaves (2013), table 2.

state courts of the 75 most populous counties. Fifty-ﬁve percent of all
felony defendants’ cases involved multiple charges, including 61–68 percent of violent crimes and 53 percent of property crimes (Reaves 2013).16
Table 2 presents data on prior convictions. Overall, 60 percent of felony defendants had at least one prior conviction; 43 percent had prior
felony convictions, 30 percent had two or more prior felony convictions,
and 11 percent had more than four. For speciﬁc offenses, 48 percent of
murder defendants had prior convictions as did 53 percent of all violent
crime defendants, 56 percent of property crime defendants, and 66 percent of drug defendants.
The ﬁrst-time defendant with a clean record is not a mythological
beast, but he or she is far from the norm. The multiple offender paradox
exposes the inadequacy of traditional or any imaginable retributive theories by themselves. The challenges it poses are equally insurmountable
for positive versions of retributive theory that would specify precise
punishments in individual cases, for negative versions that specify upper
limits, or for mixed theories. Theories of punishment that cannot coher-

16
The American experience is paralleled elsewhere. Anthony Doob in private communication reported that Statistics Canada data for 2014 show that nationally 60 percent of
convictions involved more than one offense, ranging from 55 percent in Quebec to 72 percent in the Yukon. Roberts and de Keijser (2017, p. 1) write of England and Wales, “In
England and Wales, the Sentencing Council has estimated that approximately 40 percent
of sentencing decisions involved multiple crimes.” Good national data are unavailable in
either country about the percentage of convicted offenders who have previously been
convicted.
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TABLE 2
Prior Convictions, by Most Serious Felony,
75 Largest US Counties, 2009

Most Serious
Charge
All felonies
Violence
Murder
Rape
Robbery
Property
Motor vehicle
theft
Burglary
Drugs

No Prior
Convictions
(%)

Misdemeanor
One
Convictions
Felony
Only (%)
Only (%)

Two to
Four
Felonies
(%)

FourPlus
Felonies
(%)

40
47
52
49
48
44

17
16
9
15
13
16

13
13
13
14
13
11

19
16
14
12
17
16

11
8
13
10
9
13

38
39
34

14
17
16

11
13
13

20
18
22

17
13
15

SOURCE.—Reaves (2013), table 7.

ently explain how half to two-thirds of people convicted of crime should
be punished are fundamentally incomplete.
2. Blameworthiness. Most retributive theories assume that assessments
of blameworthiness can be made more or less objectively, on the basis of
the offense of conviction perhaps modiﬁed by circumstances such as
weapon use, gratuitous violence, or a victim’s special vulnerability that
seem inextricably related to moral assessment of the seriousness of the
crime. Serious arguments have been made, however, that decisions about
punishment should incorporate subjective assessments of the offender’s
blameworthiness and of the foreseeable effects of contemplated punishments on him or her as a unique individual.
Assessments of blameworthiness are difﬁcult and contested. Nothing
inherent in any retributive theory entails a particular approach. Assessments and resulting punishments might be based, objectively, solely on
the seriousness of the crimes of which individuals are convicted or, subjectively, on crimes’ distinctive features and the social, psychological,
economic, and situational circumstances causally related to their commission (von Hirsch 1976; Tonry 2014). Criminal law in English-speaking
countries takes no account of motives, caring only about the classic mens
rea categories of intention, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, and
allows only limited space for defenses of duress, necessity, immaturity,
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emotional distress, and mental disability and usually none at all for harms
resulting from imperfect self-defense and other honest but unreasonable
mistakes.17 If the substantive criminal law does not take account of these
and other complexities of human lives, decisions about punishment can
incorporate what Hart (1968) approvingly called informal mitigation.
Nigel Walker (1991) proposed that, if retributivists take moral blameworthiness seriously, assessments should be subjective. That, he observed,
is how the Recording Angel would do it.
A similar question can be asked about the effects of punishments on individuals. Adam Kolber (2009) and others have proposed that judges
making punishment decisions take account of their foreseeable subjective effects on individuals.18 Otherwise, the suffering caused by seemingly
generic punishments will be radically different. Claustrophobic and mentally ill people, for example, will be affected by close conﬁnement substantially differently than are people who are not similarly afﬂicted. Conﬁnement of people with dependent children will have substantially different
direct and collateral effects than does conﬁnement of the childless. Imprisonment may mean very different things to a young gang leader, a ﬂamboyantly gay man, an employed middle-aged parent, and someone who is
seriously ill. To ignore such things in relation to comparably culpable people, however culpability is measured, is to accept huge differences in the
pains imposed on them.
Walker, Hart, and Kolber make much the better arguments. Systems
of punishment that ignore fundamental differences in offenders’ subjective blameworthiness, or radical differences in the effects on them of ostensibly generic punishments, cannot be reasonably described as just.

17
In common law countries but typically not in continental European civil law
countries, afﬁrmative defenses such as self-defense are not available to defendants who
honestly but unreasonably believe their actions to be justiﬁable. Imperfect self-defense
cases, e.g., involve defendants who genuinely believe themselves to be threatened by serious bodily harm or death when they were not and when reasonable persons would have
known they were not.
18
Kolber revived ideas at least two centuries old. Bentham (1970, chap. VI) was adamant
that punishments must be adjusted to offenders’ “sensibilities.” Kant (1965, p. 101) called
for attention to be paid “to the special sensibilities of the upper classes” so that the privileged
will be punished equivalently to the poor. His most vivid example is of a “man of a higher
class” who would be condemned to “solitary and painful conﬁnement” for an offense for
which a “social inferior” would be called on only to apologize “because by this means, in addition to the discomfort suffered, the pride of the offender will be painfully affected, and thus
his humiliation will compensate for the offense as like for like.”
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C. Practical Impediments
The practical impediments are no less confounding. These problems
are most acute in the United States, where 90–95 percent of convictions
in almost all jurisdictions result from guilty pleas, most emerging from
diverse forms of plea negotiation. Practices vary widely. In many charge
bargains, some among multiple charges of similar offenses are dismissed.
Even in a world of bulk discounts, this reduces sentences. In other charge
bargains, defendants are allowed to plead guilty to less serious charges
(e.g., theft or sexual assault); more serious ones (e.g., robbery or rape)
are dismissed. Conviction numbers and labels thus become fundamentally misleading. In sentence bargaining, defendants plead guilty to the
offenses charged, but in exchange for an agreed sentence. In fact bargaining, prosecutors agree not to allege facts that if proven would result
in a mandatory minimum sentence, trigger policies that prescribe aggravated penalties, or offend idiosyncratic judicial sensibilities that lawyers
believe make harsher penalties more likely. Patterns of plea negotiation
often vary substantially between counties within a state: charge dismissals
in some, charge reductions in some, and sentence agreements in others.
People convicted of the same nominal crime will often have engaged in
very different behaviors. Many different kinds of acts reﬂecting diverse
degrees of objective blameworthiness are hidden behind the names of
the offenses of which people are convicted. Finally, a “trial tax” almost
always results in harsher sentences for defendants convicted at trial than
they would have received otherwise (Kim 2015).
These problems are not uniquely American. Plea bargaining in England and Wales is less ornate than in the United States but results in
as much as a one-third reduction in sentence for defendants who plead
guilty early (Ashworth 2015). From the defendant’s perspective, the English trial tax can be 50 percent. This is considerably higher than is conventional in the United States.
Retributive punishment theories cannot in their own terms provide
much guidance for thinking about the handling of particular cases. Blameworthiness, the core concept, is difﬁcult to deﬁne in theory and harder to
characterize in practice. That does not, of course, make blameworthiness
unimportant, but it can provide at best a partial account of how a principled
system of punishment should operate. Like the shadows ﬂickering on the
walls of Plato’s cave, it provides impressions of what a just system might
look like, but no more than that.
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The problems with real-world application of retributive punishment
theories are fundamental. They are also ironic; the retributivist revival
was a reaction to real-world problems. It occurred neither in a vacuum
nor from turbulence in university philosophy departments but in response
to perceptions of stark injustices (Matravers 2011). By emphasizing blameworthiness as a primary consideration, and a limit on the discretions of
ofﬁcials, it aimed to right wrongs.
What is needed is a conceptual account of punishment that can address
real-world problems in principled ways. The following section suggests
how one can be developed.

II. Just Punishment
Questions about justice in punishment cannot be answered by invocation
only of retributive and utilitarian theories. They are “monist,” which implies, asserted Berlin (2002), the false view that moral questions have single correct answers and that all those answers dovetail within a single,
coherent moral system. In the introduction, I quoted and illustrated Berlin’s famous assertion about value pluralism and the inevitability of conﬂicts between implications of equally important ﬁrst principles.
Punishment is a realm in which value pluralism is unavoidable. Since
the times of Bentham and Kant, conﬂict between the implications of preventive utilitarian and blame-imputing retributive premises have been
evident, leading to zero-sum-game arguments and the emergence of mixed
theories. Values other than those associated with retributivism and utilitarianism, however, also need to be taken into account. Before making
that case, two preliminary matters warrant redundant mention.
First, as many people believe about abortion, perhaps the best solution
to value conﬂict about punishment is simply to choose between polar
approaches. This is not a real option. No one subscribes in our time to
unconstrained utilitarianism. Almost no one subscribes to positive retributivism, the view that people must be punished in a particular amount
that is proportionate to the seriousness of their crime, no less and no
more. Most people subscribe to forms of negative retributivism or other
mixed theories. These positions by deﬁnition encompass nonretributive
values.
Second, if no single “pure” normative framework is imaginable, perhaps the best approach is simply to adopt a mixed theory approach that
directs judges to take retributive and utilitarian elements into account
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as appears warranted. As Section I made clear, that won’t work. No form
of retributivism by itself, or combined only with instrumental crime prevention considerations, can resolve the multiple offense paradox, adequately specify criteria for assessing blameworthiness, or take account
of practical administrative issues. In any case, directing judges simply
to choose governing punishment purposes case by case would recreate
the problems, and dangers, of unconstrained discretion that indeterminate sentencing presented and the retributivist revival sought to address.
A just punishment system would be pluralist and take account of competing normative claims. It would in retributive terms take account of
offenders’ blameworthiness. It would in Bentham’s terms be parsimonious, imposing no unjustiﬁable human suffering. It would in Dworkin’s
terms treat offenders with equal concern and respect, allowing each to
be assessed according to appropriate criteria in his or her individual
circumstances and situation. It would in Rawls’s terms be fair, using procedures and standards that are transparent, consistent, and evenhandedly
applied.
Fairness, equality, proportionality, and parsimony can all be subsumed
within a broader concept of respect for human dignity. The term “human
dignity” has, however, wrongly, a bad name in some intellectual circles:
largely because of particular contexts, and ways, in which it is used and
because it is often used polemically to express strong opposition to something the speaker abhors. Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker (2008,
p. 28), for example, wrote that “the problem is that ‘dignity’ is a squishy,
subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned
to it.” The context was his frustration that religious members of the second President Bush’s Council on Bioethics decried abortion, birth control, and fetal tissue research as violations of human dignity, which he
found troubling and dogmatic. Pinker’s reaction, however, was overblown. He should have objected not to the words “human dignity” but
to their use as conversation-stopping “polar words.” Thurman Arnold
(1937) long ago showed that epithets such as communist and fascist, or
in our time racist, sexist, and homophobic, stop discussions entirely or
shift their focus from whatever is under consideration to whether the
adjectives are being unfairly used. Opposing fetal tissue research as a violation of human dignity is a polemical parallel to use of pro-life and prochoice to label positions on abortion, emotionally satisfying to advocates
but not conducive to dispassionate discussion or problem solving.
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Lawyers are troubled by the term’s absence from American constitutional law. Harvard law professor Carol Steiker observed that “dignity
remains largely a constitutional cipher, lacking a home in any speciﬁc
amendment of the Bill of Rights or a substantial or well-theorized role
in American constitutional jurisprudence” (2014, p. 20). She argued that
the concept may be better used to express a general social value than to
characterize an individual right and has “collective” value in explaining
why practices such as shaming, extreme punishments, and some mandatory sentencing laws are objectionable. Her context is American constitutional law at the end of a 40-year period in which conservative US
Supreme Court justices have systematically impoverished legal understanding of individual rights generally, especially concerning the criminal
justice system. “Human dignity,” however, is no more amorphous than
“privacy,” “due process,” “equal protection,” and “cruel and unusual,”
terms with which American courts and lawyers have dealt for two centuries. That courts have not yet developed a jurisprudence of human dignity
does not mean that they cannot or should not.19
Philosophers have not until recently begun to develop robust understandings of human dignity, but that is changing (e.g., Darwell 2006,
2013; Waldron 2012). Meir Dan-Cohen argued that all of the substantive criminal law, a much broader subject than punishment, should be
reconceptualized to replace its traditional emphasis on the “harm principle” with “what may be called the dignity principle: the view that the main
goal of the criminal law is to defend the unique moral worth of every human being” (2002, p. 150; emphasis in original).
Jeremy Waldron in “What Do the Philosophers Have against Dignity?” (2014) surveyed writing by philosophers troubled by the term’s
historic associations with social rank and religiosity. As his title implies,
he was unconvinced that the concept is inherently too vague to be useful
and offered a platform, free of those associations, on which he and others
might build: “To respect someone you have to pay attention to them and
their situation. . . . As a foundational idea, human dignity might ascribe to
each person a very high rank, associated with the sanctity of her body, her
control of herself, the demands she can make on others, and her determination of her own destiny, values and capacities” (pp. 10, 15).
19
Law reviews abound in articles considering the possibilities (e.g., Rao 2008). Henry
(2011) identiﬁed ﬁve emerging legal applications of dignity concepts—concerning institutional status, equality, liberty, personal integrity, and collective virtue.
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Waldron’s insistence that attention be paid to people and their situation—“morality requires us to do this anyway” (p. 15)—is not very different from Dworkin’s (1977) insistence that people be treated as equals and
that their situations and circumstances be considered with concern and
respect when decisions are made affecting their interests. That is how a
just punishment system should deal with people convicted of crimes.
This is what Steiker (2014, p. 34) seems to mean when she observed that
“respecting the individuality of offenders in sentencing implicates both
collective and individual dignity interests.” The US Supreme Court in
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 and 304 (1976), acknowledged, though only concerning capital punishment, that “individualizing
sentencing determinations generally reﬂects simply enlightened policy”
and that not doing so would be to treat “all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass.” That is self-evidently right, making
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of disproportionately severe punishment other than capital punishment a moral anomaly
(see n. 3).
Human dignity provides a framework for thinking about punishment
for crime. As on many other issues concerning punishment, Kant and
Bentham understood this better than many contemporary writers do.
Kant, a positive retributivist in the terms used in this essay, argued that
convicted murderers should be executed even in a dissolving island society in which all inhabitants would soon embark on ships to live in other
places. However, he observed, the murderer should be treated with respect: “But the death of the criminal must be kept entirely free of any
maltreatment that would make an abomination of the humanity residing
in the person suffering it” (2011, p. 33).
Bentham insisted that all punishment is “evil” and justiﬁable only when
its beneﬁts exceed the detriments experienced by the offender. In making
that determination, he further insisted that punishments be individualized
to take account of the offender’s “sensibilities,” those personal characteristics that might make the experience of punishment worse for a particular
individual than for others. His notion of what this encompassed was exhaustive.20 His Rule 6 on the distribution of punishment thus provided:
20
“Of Circumstances Inﬂuencing Sensibility. . . . It may be of use to sum up all the circumstances which can be found to inﬂuence the effect of any exciting cause. . . . They seem
to be as follows: 1. Health. 2. Strength. 3. Hardiness. 4. Bodily imperfection. 5. Quantity
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It is further to be observed, that owing to the different manners and
degrees in which persons under different circumstances are affected by
the same exciting cause, a punishment which is the same in name will
not always either really produce, or even so much as appear to others to
produce, in two different persons the same degree of pain: therefore,
That the quantity actually inﬂicted on each individual offender may correspond to the quantity intended for similar offenders in general, the several
circumstances inﬂuencing sensibility ought always to be taken into account.
(Bentham 1970, p. 169; emphasis in original)
Taken together, Kant’s and Bentham’s views, not unlike Dworkin’s, require that offenders be treated with concern and respect and treated in
ways that accord with their dignity as individual human beings.
Proportionality, parsimony, equality, and fairness are values that characterize a punishment system that respects human dignity. Determining
just punishments in individual cases is intrinsically difﬁcult. Nuanced differences between defendants and suspects, and among offenses, lead
practitioners to want to handle seemingly similar offenses in different
ways. Issues of social and racial injustice are salient in every courtroom.
Whether social and economic disadvantage should provide a defense
to criminal charges or an appropriate basis for systematic mitigation of
punishment is one. Whether evidence of social, racial, ethnic, or religious
bias in the operation of criminal justice systems should be taken into account at sentencing is another. A third is that all purposeful inﬂiction of
pain including state punishment is an undesirable thing to do, as Bentham
believed, and should always lead to imposition of the least restrictive appropriate punishment, or none at all if proportionality concerns do not
otherwise require.
English philosopher Matt Matravers (2011, p. 37) explained why retributive principles by themselves are insufﬁcient justiﬁcations for punishment. He observed that “the issue is not one of reconciling [punish-

and quality of knowledge. 6. Strength of intellectual powers. 7. Firmness of mind. 8. Steadiness of mind. 9. Bent of inclination. 10. Moral sensibility. 11. Moral biases. 12. Religious
sensibility. 13. Religious biases. 14. Sympathetic sensibility. 15. Sympathetic biases. 16. Antipathetic sensibility. 17. Antipathetic biases. 18. Insanity. 19. Habitual occupations. 20. Pecuniary circumstances. 21. Connexions in the way of sympathy. 22. Connexions in the way
of antipathy. 23. Radical frame of body. 24. Radical frame of mind. 25. Sex. 26. Age.
27. Rank. 28. Education. 29. Climate. 30. Lineage. 31. Government. 32. Religious profession” (Bentham 1970, p. 52).
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ment] practices to desert . . . but rather it is one of thinking about the
requirements of liberal justice as a whole.” Thought of in that way, it is
clear—as the multiple offense paradox and myriad subjective differences
between seemingly comparable cases demonstrate—that values other than
blameworthiness and crime prevention should be taken into account.
Incorporation of fairness and equal treatment values into a comprehensive jurisprudence of punishment raises three major matters.21 First,
these additional values are not simply side constraints on the pursuit of
retributive or utilitarian aims. Dworkin (1977) long ago wrote of “rights
as trumps.” Fairness and equal treatment need to be recognized as trumps
on punishments that might otherwise be justly imposed.
Retributive or utilitarian reasoning may sometimes appear to justify
punishments that other values forbid. Retributivists, for example, often
argue that the logic of utilitarianism justiﬁes punishment of innocent people if that will minimize human suffering. The classic example is the wrongful conviction and punishment in the American South of an innocent
black man charged with rape of a white woman when the judge believes
doing so will avert race riots or lynchings (McCloskey 1965). Critics point
out that retributivism implies breathtakingly severe punishments and is
irreconcilable with the bulk discount: if 3 months is a just punishment
for one drug sale or shoplifting conviction, then 300 months should be
right for 100 (Ryberg 2017).
When such issues arise, the retributive or utilitarian punishment logic
must give way: knowing convictions or punishments of innocent people
and imprisonment of people for 25 years for minor offenses are irreconcilable with respect for human dignity. The moral deﬁciencies inherent
in knowing conviction of the innocent are self-evident. Imposition of
25-year prison terms for triﬂing crimes, no matter how many, warrants
elaboration. It violates fairness values. Prosecutors possess enormous discretion and seldom charge or insist on guilty pleas to enormous numbers
of equivalent crimes. It denies equal treatment by implying that triﬂing
crimes in any number warrant more censure than individual instances
of serious sexual or other violence or large property offenses. It also

21
“Equal treatment” here and below is used not literally to mean identical or the same
treatment but as shorthand for Dworkin’s “treatment as an equal” with concern and respect. This means that individuals’ personal circumstances and characteristics need to be
taken sensitively into account when considering how general rules should be applied.
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denies equal treatment by ignoring the underlying psychological or situational reasons why people commit large numbers of minor crimes. More
importantly, it implies that the offender’s interest in living an autonomous
life is unimportant, even though 25 years is more than half of a human
being’s best years and lengthy imprisonment fundamentally handicaps
ex-prisoners’ prospects for a good life.
Other countries’ legal systems take human dignity seriously in relation
to punishment (Whitman 2016). The German constitution declares dignity to be a fundamental principle that governs all applications of law
(Whitman 2004). The German Constitutional Court, for example, has
forbidden many prison practices that are commonplace in the United
States as violations of human dignity. It declared life without parole sentences unconstitutional in part because they are incompatible with human
dignity: no human being should be denied the possibility of hope for a better future life (lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe, 21 June 1977, 45 BverfGE 187).
Similar ideas underlie the shorter maximum prison sentences—often 12
or 14 years for any offense or set of offenses other than murder, and much
shorter for most offenses—authorized in continental European than in
Anglo-Saxon legal systems (van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009). They also
underlie the ad hoc rationalizations—“crushing sentences,” depriving an
individual of too large a portion of his or her remaining life, mercy—that
are offered in other countries to explain the bulk discounts received by
people convicted of multiple offenses ( Jareborg 1998 [Sweden]; Ashworth
and Wasik 2017 [England and Wales]; Bottoms 2017 [Australia]).
Second, the multiple values the practice of punishment implicates are
not simply alternatives from which judges should choose; all set independent limits. American criminal codes usually provide that the purposes
of the criminal law, punishment, or sentencing include at least imposition of deserved punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Those lists serve as buffets from which judges may choose and provide no criteria for making the choices. Matravers (forthcoming) proposes
something like a buffet when he calls for a “plural” rather than a “mixed”
account of punishment in which censure and deterrence are independent
governing principles: “The results may well be counter-intuitive (one
might end up threatening more severe hard treatment for less serious,
but harder to detect, crimes than for more serious, more easily detected,
crimes),” he observes, but “it is not inconsistent so long as censure and
deterrence are independent.”
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This is not very different from Henry M. Hart’s (1958, p. 401) classic
refutation of the Model Penal Code’s primarily rehabilitative purposes.22
He observed that deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, norm reinforcement, satisfaction of the “community’s sense of just retribution,”
and “even socialized vengeance” all have roles to play and that judges
and parole boards must take account of them case by case as they are pertinent. Note, however, a fundamental contextual difference. Matravers
wrote at a time when retributivism was widely seen as relevant, including
by him, as a principled justiﬁcation for punishment. When Hart wrote
60 years earlier, indeterminate sentencing and utilitarian approaches
were unchallenged. Retribution to him was germane not as a general
guiding principle but only sometimes, usually in connection with sensational cases, as acknowledgment of public opinion.
Matravers’s example of serious crimes punished less severely than
lesser ones and Hart’s elaboration illustrate and underlay the core problems of indeterminate sentencing that retributive theorists in the 1970s
sought to address and remedy. Punishing lesser crimes more harshly than
greater ones deﬁes common morality and undermines basic social norms.
Conferring authority on individual judges to choose among and apply irreconcilable purposes assures outcomes often based more on judicial idiosyncrasies, personalities, and ideologies than on differences between
offenses and offenders. Broad discretions are especially vulnerable to inﬂuence by invidious considerations including racial and class bias, negative stereotypes, and unconscious bias.
Third, a comprehensive jurisprudence of just punishment that respects
human dignity would require subjective assessments of blameworthiness.
David Luban (2007, pp. 70–72) observed that subjectivity lies at the heart
of human dignity and that “having human dignity means having a story of
one’s own. . . . Human beings have ontological heft because each of us is
an ‘I’, and I have ontological heft. For others to treat me as though I have
none fundamentally denigrates my status in the world. It amounts to a
form of humiliation that violates my human dignity.”
William James in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) offers a
similar, more general, metaphorical observation about the need to take
22
Both Matravers and Hart explicitly refer to the purposes of the criminal law rather
than of punishment but appear to subsume punishment’s within the criminal law’s purposes. H. L. A. Hart (1968), by contrast, distinguishes between the—for him, preventive—purposes of the criminal law and other possible purposes of punishment.
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individuals seriously: “Any object that is inﬁnitely important to us and
awakens our devotion feels to us also as if it must be sui generis and
unique. Probably a crab would be ﬁlled with a sense of outrage if it could
hear us classify it without ado or apology as a crustacean, and thus dispose of it. ‘I am no such thing,’ it would say; ‘I am MYSELF, MYSELF
alone’ ” (p. 3).
Plutarch (1957, p. 355) observed of boys playing by a stream on a summer day, “Though boys throw stones at frogs in sport, yet the frogs do
not die in sport but in earnest.” The frog’s perspective, Luban’s subjective perspective, cannot be justly ignored. A just sentencing system must
harness the tension between the requirement of fairness that there be
general standards that apply to all and the requirement of justice that
all ethically important grounds for distinguishing between individuals
be taken into account.
In the introduction, I described a comprehensive jurisprudence of just
punishment consisting of principles of fairness, equality, proportionality,
and parsimony. Blameworthiness and censure play central roles. No sentencing system could be said to be just unless it set rigid upper limits,
keyed to blameworthiness, on the severity of punishment and unless
values of fairness, equal treatment, and parsimony are respected.
Human dignity underlies the case for fairness, which largely concerns
process; the case for parsimony, which requires avoidance of gratuitous
harm; and the case for treatment as an equal, which requires consideration of an offender’s circumstances and situation. This proposed jurisprudence of just punishment allows judges to make individualized assessments of blameworthiness and insists that gratuitous harm not be done.
It recognizes the complexity and myriad differing circumstances of human
lives. It cannot resolve fundamental issues of social and racial injustice but
empowers judges to make individualized assessments of offenders’ particular circumstances and blameworthiness within the constraints set by
the other principles.
The proposed jurisprudence provides solutions to the multiple offense
paradox. The bulk discount is morally necessary. Without it, punishments would be so severe that they would be incompatible with human
dignity and so mechanical that they would fail to treat offenders and their
interests with equal concern and respect. Every human being has but one
life to live, lives it within particular circumstances, and makes countless
mistakes. To ignore that is to ignore that we are human.
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The recidivist premium to the contrary is morally unjustiﬁable. If the
potential aggregate severity of sentences for multiple current convictions
calls for imposition of something much less, for “mercy,” the burdens of
recidivist premiums call at least as loudly. Depriving individuals of a large
part of their remaining lives is as wrong when it is done piecemeal as
when it is done at one time. Other objections to the recidivist premium
are familiar ones. Imposition of increments of additional punishment
because of earlier convictions is double counting, effectively punishing
offenders a second time for their prior offenses. Punishing a subsequent
offense more severely than a ﬁrst offender is punished for the same offense breaks the link between blameworthiness and deserved punishment.
The proposed jurisprudence of just punishment provides a ﬁrm foundation for operation of the parsimony principle. Lippke (2017) has argued that “parsimony” is redundant, an empty concept, because both retributive and utilitarian theories explicitly reject punishment more severe
than is theoretically justiﬁable. Parsimony is better understood, however,
as deriving not from punishment principles but from respect for human
dignity. Bentham was adamant: “All punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. . . . If it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil” (1970,
p. 158).
Bentham’s view was imbedded within utilitarianism. It is better viewed
as coming from outside as Braithwaite and Pettit (1990, 2001) do when
they describe “dominion,” the capacity to live a life of one’s choosing,
as the value most at stake in thinking about both crime and punishment.
The requirement that all people be treated with equal concern and respect can help address the problem of “just deserts in an unjust society”
(von Hirsch 1976; Tonry 2014). Punishments of people living fundamentally disadvantaged lives, or who are powerfully affected by mental
disabilities or acute problems of drug dependence, should be determined
in terms of the choices and possibilities available to them and not on the
false premise that the hard realities of their lives are different than they
are, or do not matter.
There is one important problem, however, that the proposed jurisprudence cannot meaningfully address: determination of ordinally deserved
punishments or of the anchoring points of penalty scales that are necessary for any system of ordinally proportionate punishments to work
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(Lacey and Pickard 2015). Those judgments depend on cultural attitudes
toward crime, criminals, and punishment severity that vary widely and
that no mechanical or theoretical ﬁx can resolve. Palpable differences exist between countries in such matters: think only of contrasts between the
United States and Scandinavia or between England and Switzerland.
Achieving acceptance of ideas about ordinal proportionality and the
moral necessity of interoffense comparisons in punishment is a more easily achievable goal and constitutes steps in the right direction.
The issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs require much fuller
exploration and elaboration than is possible here. The important thing to
recognize, however, is that they raise problems that retributive punishment theories now in use cannot adequately address by themselves but
that a normative framework incorporating fundamental principles of
fairness, equality, proportionality, and parsimony could.
Moving toward a comprehensive jurisprudence of just punishment will
require partial abandonment or substantial ampliﬁcation of most retributive and mixed theories of punishment. This change may not be as unlikely as some may believe. It will require a paradigm shift, which Thomas
Kuhn (1962) demonstrated seldom happens in the physical sciences until
prevailing ways of thinking change sufﬁciently to absorb unfamiliar,
seemingly heretical ideas. However, that is what happened when retributive punishment theories replaced utilitarian ones in the minds of most
policy makers, philosophers, and academic lawyers in the 1960s and
1970s. The American law professor Albert Alschuler (1978, p. 552) bewilderedly described the then-recent sea change in attitudes toward the rehabilitative presuppositions of indeterminate sentencing: “That I and
many other academics adhered in large part to this reformative viewpoint
only a decade or so ago seems almost incredible to most of us today.”
Nozick (1981, pp. 2–3) explained how such things happen:
When a philosopher sees that premisses he accepts logically imply a
conclusion he has rejected until now, he faces a choice: he may accept
this conclusion or reject one of the previously accepted premisses. . . .
His choice will depend on which is greater, the degree of his commitment to the various premisses or the degree of his commitment to
denying the conclusion. It is implausible that these are independent of
how strongly he wants certain things to be true. The various means of
control over conclusions explain why so few philosophers publish
ones that (continue to) upset them.
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It is time for proponents of retributive and mixed theories to adopt and
argue for new “premisses.”

REFERENCES

Advisory Council of Judges, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. 1963.
Model Sentencing Act. Hackensack, NJ: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
Alschuler, Albert. 1978. “Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 126:550–77.
American Law Institute. 1962. Model Penal Code. Proposed Ofﬁcial Draft. Philadelphia: American Law Institute.
———. 2017. Model Penal Code: Sentencing. Philadelphia: American Law Institute.
Ancel, Marc. 1965. Social Defence: A Modern Approach to Criminal Problems. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Arnold, Thurman. 1937. The Folklore of Capitalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Ashworth, Andrew. 2015. Sentencing and Criminal Justice. 5th ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Ashworth, Andrew, and Martin Wasik. 2017. “Sentencing the Multiple Offender:
In Search of a ‘Just and Proportionate’ Total Sentence.” In More than One
Crime: Sentencing the Multiple Offender, edited by Jesper Ryberg, Julian V.
Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bagaric, Mirko. 2010. “Double Punishment and Punishing Character: The Unfairness of Prior Convictions.” Criminal Justice Ethics 19:10–28.
Beccaria, Cesare. 2007. On Crimes and Punishments, and Other Writings. Translated by Aaron Thomas and Jeremy Parzen. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press. (Originally published 1764.)
Bennett, C. 2010. “ ‘More to Apologise For’: Can We Find a Basis for the Recidivist Premium in a Communicative Theory of Punishment?” In Previous
Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives, edited by J. V.
Roberts and A. von Hirsch. Oxford: Hart.
Bentham, Jeremy. 1970. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. Oxford: Clarendon. (Originally
published 1789.)
———. 2002. “Nonsense Upon Stilts, or Pandora’s Box Opened, or the French
Declaration of Rights Preﬁxed to the Constitution of 1791 Laid Open and Exposed.” In The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Rights, Representation, and
Reform: Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the French Revolution, edited
by Philip Schoﬁeld, Catherine Pease-Watkin, and Cyprian Blamires. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
———. 2008. The Rationale of Punishment. Amherst, NY: Kessinger. (Originally
published 1830.)

152

Michael Tonry

Berlin, Isaiah. 2002. Liberty. Edited by Henry Hardy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Blackstone, William. 1979. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published 1769.)
Blumstein, Alfred, Jacqueline Cohen, Susan E. Martin, and Michael Tonry, eds.
1983. Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
Bottoms, Anthony E. 1998. “Five Puzzles in von Hirsch’s Theory of Punishment.” In Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory, edited by Andrew Ashworth
and Martin Wasik. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2017. “Exploring an Institutionalist and Post-Desert Theoretical Approach to Multiple Offence Sentencing.” In More than One Crime: Sentencing
the Multiple Offender, edited by Jesper Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts, and Jan W.
de Keijser. New York: Oxford University Press.
Braithwaite, John. 2018. “Minimally Sufﬁcient Deterrence.” In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 47, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Braithwaite, John, and Philip Pettit. 1990. Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of
Criminal Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2001. “Republicanism and Restorative Justice: An Explanatory and
Normative Connection.” In Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice, edited
by John Braithwaite and Heather Strang. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Cottingham, J. G. 1979. “Varieties of Retributivism.” Philosophical Quarterly
29:238– 46.
Dan-Cohen, Meir. 2002. Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 2013. Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Duff, R. Antony. 1986. Trials and Punishments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2001. Punishment, Communication, and Community. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Doing and Deserving. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Ferri, Enrico. 1906. The Positive School of Criminology. Translated by Ernest
Untermann. Chicago: C. H. Kerr.
———. 1921. Relazione sul Progetto Preliminare di Codice Penale Italiano. Milan:
L’Universelle.
Fletcher, George. 1978. Rethinking Criminal Law. Boston: Little, Brown.
Frankel, Marvin. 1973. Criminal Sentences: Law without Order. New York: Hill &
Wang.

Punishment and Human Dignity

153

Frase, Richard S. 2013. Just Sentencing: Principles and Procedures for a Workable
System. New York: Oxford University Press.
Glueck, Sheldon. 1928. “Principles of a Rational Penal Code.” Harvard Law Review 41(4):453–82.
Hampton, Jean. 1984. “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13(3):208–38.
Hart, H. L. A. 1959. “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 60:1–26.
———. 1968. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hart, Henry M. 1958. “The Aims of the Criminal Law.” Law and Contemporary
Problems 23:401–42.
Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. “Wrong [Das Unrecht].” In Elements of the Philosophy of
Right, edited by Allen W. Wood; translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (Originally published 1821.)
———. 2011. “Wrong [Das Unrecht].” In Why Punish? How Much? edited by Michael Tonry. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1821.)
Henry, Leslie Meltzer. 2011. “The Jurisprudence of Dignity.” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 160:169–233.
James, William. 1902. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Longmans,
Green.
Jareborg, Nils. 1998. “Why Bulk Discounts in Sentencing?” In Fundamentals of
Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch, edited by Andrew
Ashworth and Martin Wasik. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1965. “The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon.” In The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John Ladd. Indianapolis: Liberal Arts
Press/Bobbs-Merrill. (Originally published 1797.)
———. 2011. “The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon.” In Why Punish? How
Much? edited by Michael Tonry. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1797.)
Kim, Andrew Chongseh. 2015. “Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study.”
Mississippi Law Journal 84(5):1195–1255.
King, Nancy J., and Michael E. O’Neill. 2005. “Appeal Waivers and the Future
of Sentencing Policy.” Duke Law Journal 55(2):209–61.
Kolber, Adam. 2009. “The Subjective Experience of Punishment.” Columbia
Law Review 109:182–236.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Lacey, Nicola, and Hanna Pickard. 2015. “The Chimera of Proportionality:
Institutionalising Limits on Punishment in Contemporary Social and Political
Systems.” Modern Law Review 78(2):216– 40.
Lee, Y. 2010. “Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert.” In Previous
Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives, edited by Julian
V. Roberts and Andrew von Hirsch. Oxford: Hart.

154

Michael Tonry

———. 2017. “Retributivism and Totality—Can Bulk Discounts for Multiple
Offending Fit the Crime?” In More than One Crime: Sentencing the Multiple Offender, edited by Jesper Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Lippke, Richard L. 2011. “Retributive Sentencing, Multiple Offenders, and
Bulk Discounts.” In Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy, edited by M. D.
White. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2016. “The Ethics of Recidivist Premiums.” In The Routledge Handbook
of Criminal Justice Ethics, edited by Jonathan Jacobs and Jonathan Jackson.
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
———. 2017. “Parsimony and the Sentencing of Multiple Offenders.” In More
than One Crime: Sentencing the Multiple Offender, edited by Jesper Ryberg,
Julian V. Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser. New York: Oxford University Press.
Luban, David. 2007. Legal Ethics and Human Dignity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Mackie, John L. 1982. “Morality and the Retributive Emotions.” Criminal Justice
Ethics 1(1):3–10.
Macklin, Ruth. 2003. “Dignity Is a Useless Concept: It Means No More than
Respect for Persons or Their Autonomy.” British Medical Journal 327(December):1419–20.
Markel, Dan. 2010. “Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to
Retributive Justice.” California Law Review 98:907–87.
Matravers, Matt. 2011. “Is Twenty-First Century Punishment Post-Desert?” In
Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? edited by Michael Tonry. New York:
Oxford University Press.
———. Forthcoming. “Rootless Desert and Unanchored Censure.” In Penal
Censure: Engagements Within and Beyond Desert Theory, edited by Antje du BoisPedain and Anthony E. Bottoms. London: Hart/Bloomsbury.
McCloskey, H. J. 1965. “A Non-utilitarian Approach to Punishment.” Inquiry:
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 8(1– 4):249–63.
Menninger, Karl. 1966. The Crime of Punishment. New York: Viking.
Michael, Jerome, and Herbert Wechsler. 1940. Criminal Law and Its Administration. Chicago: Foundation.
Moore, Michael S. 1993. “Justifying Retributivism.” Israeli Law Review 27:15–36.
Morris, Herbert. 1966. “Persons and Punishment.” Monist 52:475–501.
———. 1981. “A Paternalist Theory of Punishment.” American Philosophical
Quarterly 18:263–71.
Morris, Norval. 1953. “Sentencing Convicted Criminals.” Australian Law Review
27:186–208.
———. 1974. The Future of Imprisonment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Murphy, Jeffrie. 1973. “Marxism and Retribution.” Philosophy and Public Affairs
2:217–43.
Nagin, Daniel S., Francis T. Cullen, and Cheryl Lero Jonson. 2009. “Imprisonment and Reoffending.” In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 38,
edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Punishment and Human Dignity

155

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. 1973.
A National Strategy to Reduce Crime. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce.
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. 1971. Report: Proposed Federal Criminal Code. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
———. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Pifferi, Michele. 2012. “Individualization of Punishment and the Rule of Law:
Reshaping Legality in the United States and Europe between the 19th and
the 20th Century.” American Journal of Legal History 52(3):325–76.
———. 2016. Reinventing Punishment: A Comparative History of Criminolog y and
Penology in the 19th and 20th Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pinker, Steven. 2008. “The Stupidity of Dignity.” New Republic, May 27.
Plutarch. 1957. “Whether Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer.” In Moralia, vol. 12,
translated by Harold Cherniss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
1967. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Ofﬁce.
Rao, Neomi. 2008. “On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law.”
Columbia Journal of European Law 14:201–56.
Rawls, John. 1955. “Two Concepts of Rules.” Philosophical Review 64(1):3–32.
———. 1958. “Justice as Fairness.” Philosophical Review 67(2):164 –94.
———. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reaves, Brian A. 2013. Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009—Statistical Tables. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics.
Reitz, Kevin. 2010. “The Illusion of Proportionality: Desert and Repeat Offenders.” In Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives,
edited by Julian V. Roberts and Andrew von Hirsch. Oxford: Hart.
Roberts, Julian V. 2008. Punishing Persistent Offenders: Exploring Community and
Offender Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011. “The Future of State Punishment: The Role of Public Opinion in
Sentencing.” In Retributivism Has a Past: Has It a Future? edited by Michael
Tonry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roberts, Julian V., and Jan W. de Keijser. 2017. “Sentencing the Multiple Offender: Setting the Stage.” In Sentencing Multiple Crimes, edited by Jesper
Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Robinson, Paul H. 1987. “Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal
Sanctions.” Northwestern University Law Review 82:19–42.
———. 2008. Distributive Principles of the Criminal Law: Who Should Be Punished
How Much? New York. Oxford University Press.

156

Michael Tonry

Ryberg, Jesper. 2001. “Recidivism, Multiple Offending, and Legal Justice.”
Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 36:69–94.
———. 2017. “Retributivism, Multiple Offending, and Overall Proportionality.” In More than One Crime: Sentencing the Multiple Offender, edited by Jesper
Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts, and Jan W. de Keijser. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ryberg, Jesper, and Julian V. Roberts, eds. 2014. Popular Punishment: On the
Normative Signiﬁcance of Public Opinion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schoﬁeld, Philip. 2003. “Jeremy Bentham’s ‘Nonsense Upon Stilts.’ ” Utilitas 15
(1):1–26.
Singer, Richard G. 1979. Just Deserts: Sentencing Based on Equality and Desert.
Lexington, MA: Ballinger.
Steiker, Carol S. 2014. “ ‘To See Justice in a Grain of Sand’: Dignity and Indignity in American Criminal Justice.” In The Punitive Imagination—Law, Justice,
and Responsibility, edited by Austin Sarat. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press.
Tonry, Michael. 1994. “Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of
Punishments.” In Penal Theory and Penal Practice, edited by R. A. Duff, S. E.
Marshall, R. E. Dobash, and R. P. Dobash. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
———. 2004. Thinking about Crime: Sense and Sensibility in American Penal Culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
———, ed. 2011. Why Punish? How Much? New York: Oxford University Press.
———, ed. 2012. Prosecutors and Politics: A Comparative Perspective. Vol. 41 of
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
———. 2014. “Can Deserts Be Just in an Unjust World?” In Liberal Criminal
Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch, edited by A. P. Simester, Ulfrid Neumann,
and Antje du Bois-Pedain. Oxford: Hart.
———. 2016a. Sentencing Fragments. New York: Oxford University Press.
———, ed. 2016b. Sentencing Policies and Practices in Western Countries: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives. Vol. 45 of Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2017. “Solving the Multiple Offense Paradox.” In More than One Crime:
Sentencing the Multiple Offender, edited by Jesper Ryberg, Julian V. Roberts,
and Jan W. de Keijser. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Geneva: United
Nations.
van Zyl Smit, Dirk, and Sonja Snacken. 2009. Principles of European Prison Law
and Policy: Penolog y and Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
von Hirsch, Andreas. 2017. Deserved Criminal Sentences: An Overview. Oxford:
Hart.
von Hirsch, Andrew. 1976. Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments. New York:
Hill & Wang.
———. 1986. Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Punishment and Human Dignity

157

———. 1992. “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment.” In Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 16, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1994. Censure and Sanctions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waldron, Jeremy. 2012. Dignity, Rank, and Rights. New York: Oxford University
Press.
———. 2014. “What Do the Philosophers Have against Dignity?” Working Paper 14-59, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Series. New York: New
York University Law School.
Walker, Nigel. 1991. Why Punish? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wechsler, Herbert. 1961. “Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal
Code.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 109(4):465–93.
Whitman, James. 2004. “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus
Liberty.” Yale Law Journal 113:1151–1221.
———. 2016. “Presumption of Innocence or Presumption of Mercy? Weighing
Two Western Modes of Justice.” Texas Law Review 94:933–93.
Wootton, Barbara. 1959. Social Science and Social Patholog y. London: Allen &
Unwin.
———. 1963. Crime and the Criminal Law. London: Stevens.

